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INTRODUCTION TO THE
SYMPOSIUM ON CONFLICTS OF
RIGHTS
Claire Oakes Finkelstein
University of Pennsylvania Law School
The literature on rights in both moral and legal philosophy is voluminous,
so voluminous that there may seem to be little justification for one more
symposium to swell its ranks. But the discussion of rights has been fairly
tightly organized around several narrow topics of debate, among them
whether rights should be explained in terms of interests or choices,1
whether rights are strictly correlative with duties,2 and the relation between
rights and utility.3 The inspiration for the present symposium is the sense
that one topic of central importance has generally been given short shrift:
the question of whether rights can conflict. There is, of course, a perfectly
good explanation for why this topic has received so little attention; namely
that contemporary rights theorists have generally assumed that rights cannot
conflict.4 But this assumption seems to be out of keeping with the way
people commonly speak about rights as well as the way in which rights are
usually understood in our constitutional tradition.
The papers in this volume were presented at a conference on conflicts of
rights, hosted by the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Philosophy in October 1999. Given the general sympathy of most members of
the symposium to the possibility of conflicts, it came as something of a
surprise to discover that while most of the papers in the symposium agree
that rights can conflict and agree that this has important implications for
the theory of rights, no two of the papers traces those implications in
remotely the same way. The wide divergence among papers with a common
orientation made clear to all of us that the issues addressed in this volume
are only a starting point for a much broader discussion about the role of
1. The traditional debate is between the “Interest Theory” and the “Will Theory.” For a
discussion of this, see A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS (Kramer et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1998).
2. See L.W. SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF RIGHTS §2.2 (Clarendon Press 1987) for a
discussion of this point.
3. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153–68 (Jeremy
Waldron ed., Oxford University Press 1984).
4. Notable exceptions include JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (Harvard
University Press 1990) (who allows that rights can conflict without specifically discussing the
point); JEREMY WALDRON, Rights in Conflict, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991
(Cambridge University Press 1993).
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rights in moral theory. These papers also attest to the fact that the more
traditional debates in the theory of rights far from exhaust the interesting
questions to be explored in the theory of rights. Examining the problem of
rights in conflict proved a helpful way to expose many of the novel issues
that the usual discussions in the theory of rights seem to overlook.
Frances Kamm argues that the rights people have are primarily important
because they express the person’s status as a being who has a high level of
inviolability. Once we see rights this way, we can make sense of why it could
be impermissible to violate a person’s right for the sake of preventing more
violations of the same kind. Thus we may think it impermissible to interfere
with Nazi speech for the sake of preserving more instances of free speech
itself, which the Nazi speech would foreclose. A strong conception of the
right to free speech, Kamm thinks, would “exclude as a reason to limit it
protection of free speech itself.”5 And she goes on to explain that “the right
expresses the idea of a status that each has to speak freely, even if respecting
this status results in some people who still have such a status being prevented from actually speaking freely because they improperly have their
right violated.”6 Rights can conflict, she allows, because a right can be
permissibly infringed as long as the infringement does not fundamentally
violate this inviolable status.
More than one of the papers is concerned with whether conflicts of rights
render morality inconsistent. Phillip Montague argues that if rights can conflict, it can be permissible for a right-holder to do something at the same time
that another person’s conflicting right places him under a duty to refrain
from doing it.7 The problem, Montague thinks, comes from combining the
assumption that rights can conflict with two further assumptions: first, that if
A has a right to u, it is permissible for A to u, and second, that if A has a right to
u, then others have a duty not to interfere with A’s u-ing. Montague’s solution
is to regard statements about rights as merely “prima facie”: rights can conflict at the prima facie level, but these conflicts will be resolved at the allthings-considered level at which we make final attributions of entitlements
and obligations. His solution, in short, is to deny that we can infer that it is
permissible for A to u from an initial statement that he has a right to u.
My own paper also focuses on the problem of inconsistency due to
conflicting rights. I too argue that the inconsistency is a product of combining the assumption that rights can conflict with two further assumptions:
the correlativity of rights and duties, and the assumption that if A has a right
to u, then she cannot also have a duty to refrain from u-ing. (The former
corresponds to Montague’s first assumption, but the latter diverges from his
second assumption.) After arguing that rights can conflict, I conclude that
it is the second of these two assumptions that we ought ultimately to reject.
I reach this conclusion by drawing some lessons from the literature on
5. Kamm, this issue, at 246.
6. Id.
7. Montague, this issue, at 261.
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conflicting duties, or “moral dilemmas.” In particular, I argue that the
solution proposed separately a number of years ago by Bernard Williams
and Bas Van Fraassen of rejecting the agglomeration of conflicting duties
applies to rights. Rejecting the second of the two assumptions above turns
out to be the equivalent for the theory of rights of rejecting agglomerativity
in the theory of duties.
Heidi Hurd addresses the problem of conflicts of rights through the lens
of tort law. She is interested in particular in whether tort law ought to
require potential tortfeasors to anticipate another person’s wrongful behavior, against the background of a corrective justice approach to tort law. Tort
law imposes duties to anticipate another’s wrongdoing that, Hurd argues, a
deontologist should reject. For example, the law typically requires home
owners to take precautions against unsafe conditions on their land on
behalf of trespassers, drivers to anticipate other people’s wrongful driving,
and people to guard against criminal activity by locking their doors and
windows and removing their keys from their cars. The reason these requirements are unjustified, Hurd thinks, is that a person who engages in no
wrongdoing himself ought not to have his activities limited by the wrongdoing of others. While the claim Hurd rejects, she says, does not involve a
conflict of rights strictly speaking, it does involve the suggestion that
“wrongdoers, by their wrongdoing, acquire rights that others should abandon actions that they (otherwise) have rights to do.”8 It is, she claims, the
assertion that “the perpetration of a wrong trumps the exercise of a right,”
a claim she thinks a deontologist should find “perversely paradoxical.”9
While Hurd does not articulate her thesis in terms of conflicts of rights, she
suggests that the intuition that rights cannot conflict may be part of what
drives her argument.
Finally, Leo Katz argues that there are situations in which it is possible
for various parties to a conflict all to be justified, and all to be in the right,
even though they oppose one another. Indeed, he thinks the world has
witnessed an unresolvable conflict of precisely this sort: World War I. In
arguing against what he calls the “Correspondence Thesis,” Katz attacks
precisely the thesis for which Hurd had argued in her book, Moral Combat.
The Correspondence Thesis maintains that if X has a right to u, then Y
does not have a right to hinder X’s u-ing. The intuition behind the Correspondence Thesis is that “morality cannot be gladiatorial.”10 It is, in other
words, the worry about inconsistency in another guise. Katz argues that the
Correspondence Thesis is inconsistent with a deontological conception of
rights. The reason, he explains, is that deontological morality is “path-dependent,” meaning that the same end can be both permissible and impermissible, depending on the path by which it is attained. The result is that
each party to a conflict can be in the right in launching an attack against
8. Hurd, this issue, at 308.
9. Id.
10. Katz, this issue.
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the other, as long as he proceeds along one of the permissible paths to his
end.
Collectively, these papers constitute a detailed exploration of the question whether rights can conflict and the implications for moral and legal
theory of allowing that they can. Although Hurd is the only author of the
five implicitly to reject the possibility of conflicts of rights, she offers an
unusual defense of that rejection, one that proponents of conflicts ought
not to dismiss. Whether, as Katz would say, all parties to this conflict can be
in the right while disagreeing, my hope is that the papers in this volume will
provide the impetus for a wider discussion on the topic of conflicts of rights.
Philadelphia, April 2001
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